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PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
I.
At the common law priority of right as between succes-
sive transfers of interests in land by the same transferor is
determined by priority in time.' If A, who is seised in fee,
makes a grant of a term for years to B and subsequently
grants another term to C, the second termor, C, is not en-
titled to enter upon the land until the first term has ceased
by effluxion of time, surrender or otherwise. So if succes-
sive freehold interests are carved out of the fee by different
conveyances, the estate of the second grantee cannot take
effect until the estate of the first grantee has terminated.'
This results from the fact that if a grantor has transferred
a present interest and right to possession there is no present
interest left for the second transferee. Notice and lack of
notice have no scope of operation in such a case. The good
faith of the purchaser can give rise to no interest where
none can exist.' Neither did the absence of a valuable
consideration affect the priority as between successive trans-
ferees from the same transferor at the early law, except
where it was provided otherwise by statute.4
1 Ralph W. Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
405, 406 (1924).
2 Likewise, if A, who is seised of Blackacre in fee, transfers the fee to B and
then purports to transfer the fee to C, the latter would take nothing at law.
There is a total absence of title in A to transfer to C.
The departure from this rule, resulting from the recording acts, will be sub-
sequently discussed.
3 Iowa Land & Trust Co. v. United States, 217 Fed. 11 (1914).
4 There are some statutes that have this effect. For instance, the statute
of 27 Eliz., c. 4, provides that transfers of interests in land made for the purpose
of defrauding subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration are void as to
such purchasers. A conveyance made without valuable consideration, and followed
by a conveyance for value by the grantor, was voidable under this statute. Adams'
Equity, 5th Am. ed., 303.
The bankruptcy and insolvency acts provide that certain transfers made by a
bankrupt or insolvent shall be void. The principles that govern, in construction
of these acts, are foreign to this discussion.
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As between competing successive equitable interests in the
same subject matter, created by the same transferor, the
general equitable doctrine concerning priorities is that .the
order of time governs. If the owner of an equitable inter-
est, the legal estate being outstanding, has mortgaged his
interest or granted an annuity and afterwards undertakes
to convey his whole interest to a purchaser, the latter ac-
quires only such interest as was left in his transferor after
the mortgage or annuity was made.5 If the subsequent
transferee has notice, at the time of the transfer, of the
prior competing equitable interest, priority of right is or-
dinarily not affected thereby.6
There are some apparent exceptions to the rule that as
between successive competing equitable interests priority
of right is determined by the order of time in the creation
of such interests, and in these situations notice may be im-
portant. In order to include these exceptions, the principle
is sometimes expressed in this form: "'As between persons
having only equitable interests, qui prior est tempore potior
est jure.'" 7 But this principle applies only where the equit-
able interests are, except as to time, equal one to the other.
For instance, A, who has acquired the later equitable in-
terest in Blackacre from R, will be entitled to priority over
B, who has acquired an earlier equitable interest in Black-
.acre from R, only when, according to those principles of
right and justice which a court of equity recognizes and is
governed by, he has acquired a better equitable interest
than that of B or an equitable interest superior to that of B.
As a practical matter, the equitable interests of A and B are
equal only in those instances where a court of equity will
5 Tiffany on Real Property, 2nd ed., § 566 (c); Phillips v. Phillips, 4 De
G. F. & J. 208 (1861), per Lord Westbury.
"It is the settled doctrine of this court that where the equities of the parties
are equal, and neither has the legal title, the one who has the prior equity must
prevail." Per Chancellor Walworth, in Grimstone v. Carter, 3 Paige's Ch. 420,
436 (1832).
6 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note S.
7 Rice v. Rice, 2 Drew. 73, 77 (1853), per Sir R. T. Kindersley, V.-C.
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refuse to lend its assistance to either one as against the other
in a suit where these interests are competing.' Equality is
lacking where the transferee of the earlier equitable interest
has, by his statements or careless conduct, misled the trans-
feree of the later equitable interest.' In Rice v. Rice 1o a
vendor conveyed certain land without receiving the pur-
chase money; the receipt of it, however, was indorsed on
the deed, and the title deeds were delivered to the purchaser.
The latter made a mortgage to E, by a deposit of the title
deeds, and absconded. It was held that, as between the
vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase money and the inter-
est of the equitable mortgagee, the possession of the title
deeds and the fact of the indorsement of the receipt of the
purchase money on the deed gave the equitable mortgagee
the better equitable interest and, hence, priority of right.
When we consider the English system of conveyancing, that
was in use at the time of this decision, and the indorsement
that R made upon the deed, it is quite obvious that E was
misled here and that he had the superior equitable interest.
In Hume v. Dixon " one K, who had the legal title to certain
land subject to a vendor's lien 12 in favor of the plaintiff,
8 The principles on which a court of equity acts to protect a bona fide pur-
chaser for value without notice are not confined, in their operation, to cases
where he has got in the legal interest. If the holder of the subsequent equitable
interest stands equitably in at least as favorable a position as his opponent, the
court will not interfere against him. Colyer v. Finch, 5 H. L. Cas. 905, 920 (1856),
per Lord Cranworth.
9 "The general rule [as between competing non-recordable equitable interests]
is that he who is first in time is first in right, but this is not of universal
application. In a contest between equities it is not allowed to prevail where it
appears from any fact or circumstance in the case, independent of priority of
time, that the holder of the junior equity has the better right to perfect his equit-
able title or interest by calling in the outstanding legal estate. In such case he has
the better equity. Prima facie, however, the assignee of an equity must abide the
case of the assignor, and the superiority of the equity of the first purchaser is,
in general, undeniable, unless he has been guilty of laches, which vitiate his title
or deprive him of the right to enforce it against others who have been more
vigilant." Per Stone, J., in Churchill v. Little, 23 Oh. St. 301, 310 (1872).
10 Op. cit. supra note 7.
11 37 Oh. St. 66 (1881).
12 Professor Pomerory says that by the overwhelming weight of authority
the lien of a vendor for unpaid purchase money, where not expressly reserved,
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sold and undertook to convey the land to H for a valuable
consideration, but the deed was defective as a conveyance
of the legal title because the officer who took the acknowl-
edgment of it omitted to subscribe the same. It was held,
in reliance on Rice v. Rice, that H's equity was superior to
that of the vendor to enforce his lien. The plaintiff had
voluntarily placed the legal title in the hands of K so that
he appeared to be the owner of the complete title, and H
acted on the faith of K's ostensible ownership. The plain-
tiff should have expressly reserved a lien for the unpaid
purchase money or should have reduced his claim to a mort-
gage and thus have been enabled to record it and give at
least constructive notice to all who subsequently acquired
interests in the land. This would have conformed to the
requirements of the recording act.
In England an equitable interest or an equity has been
postponed to a subsequently acquired interest or equity in
many cases because of a failure to obtain or retain posses-
sion of the title deeds to the land in controversy. This
would rarely, if ever, occur in the United States where, un-
der our systems of conveyancing, the possession of the title
deeds possesses no general significance. In Farrand v. York-
shire Banking Company 13 E made a loan to R to enable him
to complete the purchase of certain property. R gave bond
to E to secure the repayment of this sum and agreed that
he would, as soon as the purchase was completed, execute
a legal mortgage on the property in favor of E and, upon
receipt of the title deeds, deposit them with the solicitor of
E to enable him to prepare a mortgage. The purchase was
soon completed but R did not hand the deeds over to the
solicitor; he deposited them with the Yorkshire Banking
Company as security for an overdraft. The Company had
is an equitable interest in rem; i. e., it is more than a mere equity or right to
enforce payment of the unpaid purchase money. Pomerory's Equity Jurisprudence,
4th ed., § 720, note 2, b.
13 [18881 L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 182:
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no notice of E's rights. On the faith of its security, the
Company continued the current account with R for about
twenty-two years, when there was a balance due it for which
it demanded payment. R was unable to pay, so the Com-
pany began enforcement proceedings. The executors of E
gave notice of his rights. The Company claimed priority
since it had no notice of E's claim. In an action brought
by the executors of E to establish their claim and to deter-
mine the matter of priority, it was held that the circum-
stances were such as to give the Company priority. E was
careless in not calling for the deeds, thus enabling R to
create the equitable interest in the Company. The latter
was more vigilant in having obtained possession of the chief
evidence of title without notice of E's rights. E had not
sought to obtain possession of the deeds for a long period
of time during which the Company continued the current
account with R without notice of E's rights. Possession
of the title deeds, at the time of this decision, was of great
significance in the English system of transferring interests
in land. In respect to mortgages, it was customary for one
who advanced money on what was intended to be a first
mortgage to receive the deeds." The possession of the title
deeds by one whom they showed or purported to show to
be entitled to the land was proof prima facie that there was
no m6rtgage on the land. 5 So it was advisable that an in-
tending mortgagee should, for his own protection, obtain,
if possible, the possession of the deeds and retain them.
Two general situations, in connection with the possession
of the title deeds, have been presented by the English cases:
(1) That where the mortgagee has not obtained possession
of the deeds; and (2) That where he has obtained posses-
sion of them but has returned them to the mortgagor for
some purpose. The cases where the mortgagee did not ob-
14 Falconbridge, Law of Mortgages, 2nd ed., 88.
15 Op. cit. supra note 14.
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tain possession of the deeds have been arranged in the fol-
lowing classes:16 (1) Where the mortgagee made no inquiry
for them, he has been postponed to a subsequent mortgagee
who has obtained possession of them believing that the land
was unencumbered; (2) Where the first mortgagee made
inquiry for them and received a reasonable excuse for their
non-delivery, he has not been postponed to a subsequent
mortgagee who acquired the possession; (3) Where the first
mortgagee has received a part of the deeds under the reason-
able belief that he was receiving all of them, he has not
been postponed to a subsequent mortgagee or purchaser who
had no notice of the first mortgage; and (4) Where the first
mortgagee has left the deeds in the hands of the mortgagor
for the purpose of enabling him to borrow on the security
of the land, he has been postponed to a subsequent mort-
gagee notwithstanding that the mortgagor has exceeded his
authority, if such was true, in making the second mortgage.
The cases where the first mortgagee has received the title
deeds but has subsequently returned them to the mortgagor,
who has deposited them with a second mortgagee as security
for a loan, may be classified as follows: (1) Where the deeds
have been returned to the mortgagor upon a reasonable rep-
resentation made by him as to the object in borrowing them,
the mortgagee has not been postponed to a subsequent mort-
gagee or purchaser; "7 and (2) Where the deeds have been
returned to the mortgagor for the purpose of borrowing upon
the security of them, but with the expectation that the mort-
gagor would disclose the existence of the prior mortgage, the
first mortgagee has been postponed to the second mort-
gagee."8 It is difficult to reconcile these two classes of cases.
16 Northern Countries of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Whipp [1884] L. R. 26
Ch. Div. 482, 491, 492, and cases cited.
17 Martinez v. Cooper, 2 Russ. 196 (1826) (Delivery of deeds to mortgagor
in order that they might be shown to an intending purchaser, who wished to
see what the covenants were; purchaser bought without knowledge of the mort-
gage).
18 Briggs v. Jones [1870] L. R. 10 Eq. Cas. 92.
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In each the first mortgagee has made it possible, by a sur-
render of the deeds, for the mortgagor to make the mort-
gage to a bona fide second mortgagee. In each instance
the mortgagor has violated the trust reposed in him. There
is this difference, however. In the second instance, the
mortgagor uses the deeds for the purpose intended.
The general rule being, as above discussed, that as between
competing equitable interests, he who is prior in time will
prevail unless, by his representation or conduct, he has mis-
led the later incumbrancer or purchaser, a qualification has
been suggested to the effect that the equitable interests
should be acquired from the same person, 9 and that if ac-
quired from different persons the subsequently acquired
interest should be protected in favor of one who acquires
it bona fide and for value. Thus, if B, a trustee for A,
makes an equitable mortgage to E, the cestui que trust and
E each have an immediate equity against B. E will be post-
poned to A because no interest passed to E. It is argued,
also, that "since the rights of each are mutually exclusive,
so far as equitable relief against the trustee is concerned, it
is only fair that he who first secured his right should pre-
vail." 20 On the other hand, if A, who holds an equity of
redemption in trust for B, conveys his equitable interest to G
for value, and G takes without notice of B's claim, G would
take free from such claim.21 "In such a case the personal
right in favor of B against A to enforce a trust is not in its
nature exclusive of a like personal right in favor of the pur-
chaser against the legal owner, and consequently there would
19 Ames, Purchaser for Value Without Notice, I Har. L. Rev. 1, 8, 9.
20 Note, 24 Har. L. Rev. 490, 491.
21 The English cases reach the same result whether the equities are, or are
not, mutually exclusive. See Cave v. Cave [18801 L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 639. This
is said to be in accord with the English doctrine that the assignee of a chose in
action takes subject to all prior equities against the assignor. Note, 24 Har. L.
Rev. 490, 491. In Cave v. Cave the trustee of an equity of redemption assigned
it to a purchaser for value without notice; :the latter was postponed to the cestui.
Here the cestui's right is one against the fraudulent assignor; and the assignee's
right is against the legal owner. So these rights are not mutually exclusive, because
they are against different persons. Note, 24 Har. L. Rev. 490, 491.
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seem to be no reason that the former, though earlier in time,
should exclude the latter, though such rights against the
same person in regard to the land are necessarily exclusive
one against the other, and, consequently, it is proper to pre-
fer the one which was the first acquired. This view...
conforms in principle with the doctrine, more generally ac-
cepted in this country, that the assignee of a chose in action,
for value and without notice of the equities in a third per-
son, takes free of such equities." 22
Where there is a contest between the claimant of a legal
interest in certain land and the claimant of an equitable in-
terest, both of which the same transferor purported to create,
the normal basis of priority is order of time.2" "Here, how-
ever, the doctrine of bona fide purchaser may reverse the
order. If the transferee of the legal estate was a purchaser
for value without notice he will be preferred even as against
the older equity." 24 A court of equity will not deprive a
defendant of his subsequent original purchase of a legal
interest in an estate for value without notice of the plain-
tiff's prior equitable interest. The scope of operation of
this doctrine includes a mortgagee, for he is considered as
a purchaser pro tanto.5
"It is sometimes said, in the most unlimited terms, that
a purchase for a valuable consideration, and without notice
of any kind of interest, is a defense under all circumstances,
which constitutes a complete and absolute bar to every
22 2 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 566.
23 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 406.
24 Op. cit. supra note 23.
"Nor will this court permit the party having the subsequent equity to protect
himself by obtaining a conveyance of the legal title, after he has either actual or
constructive notice of the prior equity. . . . To protect a party, therefore, and
to enable him to defend himself as a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consider-
ation, he must aver in his plea, or state in his answer, not only that there was
an equity in himself, by reason of his having actually paid the purchase money,
but that he had also clothed his equity with the legal title before he had notice
of the prior equity." Per Chancellor Walworth, in Grimstone v. Carter, op. cit.
supra note 5, at pp. 436, 437.
25 Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1 T. R. 763 (1756), per Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke.
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species of adverse claim, legal or equitable, or to obtain any
species of relief. There are dicta of the ablest judges,
which, taken literally, without limitation, would go far to
sustain this view... Such modes of declaring the doctrine
plainly need some limitation and restriction. Taken in their
literal and unqualified form, they are opposed to conclusions
established by an overwhelming weight of judicial authority,
and to the settled practice of courts of equity." 26
"The protection given to the bona fide purchaser had its
origin exclusively in equity, 7 and is based entirely upon the
fact that the jurisdiction of equity is ancillary and supple-
mental to that of the law, and upon the conception that a
court of chancery acts solely upon the conscience of litigant
parties, by compelling the defendant to do what, in foro
conscientiae, he is bound to do... The protection given to
the bona fide purchaser simply means.., that from the re-
lations subsisting between the two parties ... equity refuses
to interfere and to aid the plaintiff in what he is seeking to
obtain, because it would be unconscientious and inequitable
to do so, and the parties must be left to their pure legal
rights, liabilities and remedies... In the vast majority of
cases the protection is only given to a defendant, and as a
consequence the doctrine itself is commonly spoken of, and
ordinarily treated, as essentially a matter of defense.28 The
26 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 737.
27 "The doctrine of bona fide purchaser originated in equity jurisprudence.
* . ." Per Thomas, J., in Starr Piano Co. v. Baker, 62 So. 549 (Ala. App. 1913).
28 In Phillips v. Phillips, 4 De G. F. & J. 208, 217, 218 (1861), Lord Westbury
groups the cases in which the plea of bona fide purchaser for value without notice
would be a bar to equitable relief into three classes: (1) Where an application
is made to the auxilliary jurisdiction of the court, by the possessor of a legal title,
as in bills for the surrender of title deeds belonging to the plaintiff-a rule that
does not apply where the court exercises a legal jurisdiction concurrently with
courts of law; (2) Where a person, who has purchased an equitable interest in
land without notice of a prior equitable interest therein held by another person,
subsequently acquires an outstanding legal interest in his own right, he will not
be deprived of this advantage by a court of equity-a doctrine known as tabula
in naufraugio; (3) Where the plaintiff seeks to enforce some equity, as an equity
to set aside a deed for fraud, the plea of bona. fide purchaser is a defense. The
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very few instances " in which affirmative relief is granted to
the bona fide purchaser are exceptional; they rest upon their
special facts, and arise from the fraud of the defendant
against whom the relief is awarded." 30
The doctrine of bona fide purchaser is not a rule of prop-
erty. The application of the doctrine does not determine
the question of title between the parties. As a general rule,
equity simply refuses to interfere and do an unconscientious
act by depriving a defendant of the advantage accompanying
the purchase of the legal interest made in good faith and for
value. So the doctrine is generally applicable as a shield
in the hands of a defendant, to protect him against the claim
asserted by his adversary."
It is well settled that a bona fide purchaser of a legal in-
terest in land will not be deprived thereof at the instance of
the holder of a prior equitable interest. "The typical case
of protection of an innocent purchaser is the case where
the defendant has bought a legal title from a fraudulent
trustee or vendee." 32 But the bona fide purchaser of prop-
erty is protected not only against the equitable claim of a
term "equity" is used in contra-distinction to "equitable estate." Lord Westbury
does not include that class of cases where the purchaser acquires the legal interest
from a misconducting trustee without notice of the trust.
"The rule as to proof of bona fide purchase is that the party pleading it must
first make out satisfactory proof of purchase and payment. This is affirmative,
defensive matter, in the nature of confession and avoidance, and the burden of
proving it rests on him who asserts it. . . . This done, he need go no further,
and prove he made such purchase and payment without notice. The burden here
shifts, and if it be desired to avoid the effect of such purchase and payment,
it must be met by counter proof, that, before the payment, the purchaser had
actual or constructive notice of the equity or lien asserted, or, of some fact or
circumstance, sufficient. to put him on inquiry, which, if followed up, would
discover the equity or incumbrance." Per Stone, J., in Barton v. Barton, 75 Ala.
400, 402 (1883).
20 See illustrations in Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at §§ 780-784.
30 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 738.
81 German Savings & Loan Soc. v. De Lashmutt, 67 Fed. 399 (1895), per
Bellinger, J.; Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 739.
32 Ames, op. cit. supra note 19, at p. 4.
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cestui que trust but against all sorts of equitable claims to
the land. 3 And the same doctrine applies to protect the
bona fide purchaser of chattels. 4
It is not essential "that the innocent purchaser obtain the
entire legal interest in the property, either in quantity or
duration. The purchaser of an aliquot part of the estate,
the grantee for value of a rent charge, or the lessee for value,
may keep the interest actually acquired from the fraudulent
legal owner." " "Closely akin to a lessee's right is the
interest of a pledgee. His right is a legal right in rem, and
fundamentally different from the lien of an equitable incum-
brancer, which is a right in personam. The innocent pledgee
of a chattel may, therefore, retain his pledge until the claim
thereby secured is satisfied." 8
A bona fide purchaser will, furthermore, be protected as
against a prior equity, although he did not obtain the legal
interest at the time of his purchase, if he acquired an irre-
vocable power to acquire the legal interest upon the per-
formance of some condition. The fact that he receives
notice of the prior equity before performance of the con-
dition is immaterial. 7 In Dodds v. Hills 3 a trustee of
shares in a company wrongfully pledged them to E and
executed a power in him to register himself as owner of
them. When this arrangement was made E had no notice
of the trust; and, after having received notice thereof, he
33 Clark, Principles of Equity, § 85.
34 White v. Garden, 10 C. B. 919 (1851) (One P obtained goods by fraud
and then sold them to a bona fide purchaser); see Vold on Sales (Hornbook
Series) pp. 377-380.
35 Ames, op. cit. supra note 19, at p. 4.
36 Ames, op. cit. supra note 19, at p. 4.
"Title-deeds are, it is true, so far accessory of the title to the land as to pass
with it to the grantee, although not mentioned in the deed of conveyance. But
they are not inseparably attached to the title. The owner of the land may sever
them, if he will, and dispose of them as chattels. If, therefore, the owner of land,
after creating an equitable incumbrance in favor of A, should subsequently give
C an equitable mortgage by a deposit of the title-deeds, A could not compel the
surrender of the deeds by C, if the latter had no notice of the prior incumbrance."
Ames, op. cit. supra note 19, at pp. 4, 5.
37 Ames, op. cit. supra note 19, at p. 5.
38 2 H. & M. 424 (1865).
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registered the transfer. The court refused to deprive the
lender of his security. 9 A purchaser for value and without
notice of a prior equitable interest in land will be protected
in equity not only where he has obtained the legal interest
or acquired an irrevocable power to call for it but also
where he has the better right to call for the legal interest
than his adversary.4 0 A court of equity will not interfere
against him, at the instance of the one having a prior equit-
able interest, according to the maxim that where the equities
are equal, the law shall prevail. Where the purchaser has
acquired the legal interest he will be entitled to priority at
law, as well as in equity.
The protection given to a defendant under the bona fide
purchaser doctrine has not been confined to a defendant who
has obtained the legal interest contemporaneously with his
original purchase or to a defendant who has acquired an
irrevocable power to obtain the legal interest or has a better
right to call for it than his adversary. Cases have been in-
cluded within the scope of operation of the doctrine where it
has been necessary to determine the order of priority as be-
tween a complainant who has a prior equitable interest in
land and a defendant who, having originally been the bona
fide purchaser of a subsequent equitable interest, has after-
wards acquired the legal interest. The "most frequent in-
stance in England is that of three or more successive mort-
gages by conveyance, A, B, and C, where the first only would
obtain the legal estate and the others an equitable one. If
C, at the time of loaning his money and taking his mortgage,
has no notice of B's prior incumbrance,--that is, was a bona
89 ". . . the lender [E] was able to complete his title under the power
without further assistance from the delinquent trustee. If the lender required the
performance of some further act on the part of the trustee to complete his title,
and if before such performance he received notice of the trust, the loss would
fall upon him; for in the case supposed he could not obtain the title without
making himself a party to the continuance of the breach of trust." Ames, op. cit.
supra note 19, at p. 6, note 1.
40 Town of St. Johnsbury v. Morrill, 55 Vt. 165, 168 (1882), per judge
Powers.
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fide purchaser of the equitable estate,-on afterwards learn-
ing of B's claim,4 he may buy in or procure a transfer of A's
mortgage to himself, and may thus put himself in a position
of perfect defense against the enforcement of B's lien; he
thus acquires, in fact, not only a defense to any suit brought
by B, but the absolute precedence over B in the satisfaction
of the liens out of the mortgaged premises. This particular
application of the doctrine to successive mortgages is known
in the English equity as the rule concerning 'tacking'..." 42
A series of rules on the doctrine of tacking were laid down
in Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough: 4 (1) If a "third mort-
gagee buys in the first, though pending a bill brought by
the second mortgagee to redeem the first, yet the third mort-
gagee shall tack the first mortgage to his third mortgage;"
(2) "If a creditor by judgment, statute, or recognizance buys
in the first mortgage, he shall not tack it to his judgment,
41 If "the prior claimant is a cestui que trust, and the title of the purchaser
is thus subject to a trust either express or implied, he cannot, after notice of
such a defect, protect himself by acquiring the legal estate from the trustee."
Pomeiory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 769.
42 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 768.
"It is the established doctrine in the English law that if there be three mort-
gages in succession, and all duly registered, or a mortgage, and then a judgment,
and then a second mortgage upon the estate, tha junior mortgagee may purchase
in the first mortgage, and tack it to his mortgage, and by that contrivance 'squeeze
out' the m'ddle mortgage, and gain preference over it. The same rule would
apply if the first as well as the second incumbrance was a judgment; but the
incumbrancer who tacks must always be a mortgagee, for he stands in the light
of a bona fide purchaser, parting with his money upon the security of the mort-
gage.... The courts say, that up to the time of the decree settling the priorities,
the party may tack, or struggle for the tabula in naufraugio. The English doctrine
of tacking was first solemnly established in Marsh v. Lee [2 Vent. 337 (1671)]
under the assistance of Sir Matthew Hale, who compared the operation to a plank
in a shipwreck gained by the last mortgagee; and the subject was afterwards
very fully and accurately expounded by the Master of the Rolls, in Brace v.
Duchess of Marlborough [2 P. Wms. 491 (1728)]." 4 Kent's Comm., 12th ed.,
176, 177.
"It is essential to the existence of this equity that there shall be legal right
in the party claiming to tack, or such superior equitable right as gives him a
preferable claim to the legal estate; that both the claims shall be vested in him
in the same character, and not one in his own right, and the other as executor
or trustee; and that the advance, in respect to which the equity is claimed, shall
have been made expressly or presumptively on the credit of the estate, without
notice of the mesne equity." Adams, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 333.
43 Op. cit. supra note 42.
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etc., because he did not lend his money on the credit of the
land, has no present right therein, nor can he be called a
purchaser;" (3) If "the first mortgagee lends a further sum
to the mortgagor upon [the security of] a statute or judg-
ment, he shall retain against the mesne mortgagees till the
statute or judgment is paid [but the advance must be made
without notice, actual or constructive, of such mesne in-
cumbrance];" (4) "If a puisne incumbrancer [e. g., a fourth
mortgagee] buys in a prior mortgage [e. g., a second mort-
gage], and the legal title be in a trustee or in any third per-
son [e. g., a first mortgagee], then the buying in such first
prior mortgage will not avail," since the legal interest is
outstanding. A corollary of the third rule has been sug-
gested, viz., "that if the first mortgagee takes, without no-
tice, an assignment of the third incumbrance, the latter in-
cumbrance takes precedence over the second." 44
In Peacock v. Burt 11 one R, owner in fee of certain land,
executed a legal mortgage to E-1, who assigned the mort-
gage to A. Subsequently, R assigned his equity of redemp-
tion to E-2, who gave written notice of her mortgage to A.
A afterwards made a further advance to R, which, ,by an
indenture, R charged on the same land. Then A joined
with R in executing a transfer of and further charge on the
land in favor of E-3, without informing the latter of the
intervening incumbrance.? It was held that E-3, who had
44 Campbell, Cases on Mortgages, 408, note 1.
45 4 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 33 (1834).
46 Professor Ames said that this was not a case involving the doctrine of
tacking, but that the situation was the same in substance as if A had reconveyed
to R and R had then made a legal mortgage to E-3. Ames, op. cit. supra note
19, at p. 15, note 5.
The first rule of tacking gives a first mortgagee a power to deal with a third
mortgagee or a grantee, where a second mortgagee exists, in a capricious manner.
Also, it is contra to the general rule that a prior equity cannot be "squeezed
down" by a purchaser getting in the legal interest with notice of such equity.
Since E-2 bad given notice to A, should he be protected under the doctrine of
Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 48 (1828)? Peacock v. Burt goes further than Dearle
v. Hall because in the former case E-3 acquired the legal title; it involves real
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obtained the legal estate, was entitled to priority over E-2.
If E-3 had merely purchased A's interest and taken a trans-
fer thereof he would have had priority over E-2 regardless
of the doctrine of tacking. But as to the further charge
created in favor of E-3, we have involved an application of
the third rule of tacking. E-3 made this advance without
notice of E-2's incumbrance and obtained the legal interest
in the land. When E-3 became assignee of A the sum that
A advanced to R, after he had received notice of E-2's mort-
gage, became a prior charge on the land in favor of E-3.
It was not material whether E-3 paid by making an advance
to R or by taking an assignment from E-1. The latter
method of paying involves an application of the corollary
to the third rule of tacking.
"The assumed equity of the principle [of tacking] is, that
the last mortgagee, when he lent his money, had no notice
of the second incumbrance; and the equities between the
second and third incumbrancers being equal, the latter, in
addition thereto, has the prior legal estate or title, and he
shall be preferred." 7  But it is assuming too much to say
that the rights of these two incumbrancers are equal. The
second mortgagee is prior in point of time, and, considered
abstractly, seems to have an equal equity so that the maxim,
qui prior est tempore, potior est jure, applies as to the third
incumbrancer. By acquiring the first mortgage, the third
mortgagee acquires, by substitution, the rights of the first
mortgagee in respect to the security held by him, and he
justly acquires nothing more.48
estate. The doctrine of the latter case was considered inapplicable to equitable
interests in land until the passage of The Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. V,
c. 20 § 137, which changed the rule so as to include such interests within the
operation of that doctrine.
47 Kent, op. cit. supra note 42, at p. 177.
48 In Wortley v. Birkhead, 2 Ves. Sen. 571, 574 (1754), Lord Hardwicke
discussed the doctrine of tacking as follows: "It [the rule that a third mortgagee
having taken his mortgage without notice of a second mortgage on the land,
then purchases the first mortgage on the property, shall take priority over the
second mortgage] could not happen in any other country but this; because the
jurisdiction of law and equity are administered here in different courts, and creates
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The doctrine of tacking applies to all property, real or
personal.49 "The application of the doctrine of tacking to
personalty [in England] is to a great extent excluded by the
rules as to priority by notice in case of mortgages of choses
in action and equitable interests in funds.., and by statu-
tory regulations as to priority by registration in cases of
mortgages of chattels and ships." 1o
"Protection by tacking was abolished [in England] by the
Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874... but this enactment was
repealed as to England by the Land Transfer Act, 1875 ...
and as to Ireland by the Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act, 1881 ... Tacking is not applicable to registered charges
under the Land Transfer Act, 1875... By the Yorkshire
Registries Act, 1884... no priority or protection by legal
estate or tacking is given or allowed after the commencement
of the Act... Registration in Middlesex is not notice, and
the general rules as to tacking apply to mortgages of lands
in that country... The doctrine of tacking is virtually ex-
cluded in Ireland by the Irish Registry Act (6 Ann.,
c. 2) ... ""5 It has been abolished in England, except in
certain situations, by the Law of Property Act, 1925, sec. 90.
In the United States the doctrine of tacking is generally
rejected. It has been criticised on the ground that it is in-
consistent with principles of equity.52 The doctrine could
have no application in a "lien" jurisdiction for the mortgagor
remains the legal, as well as the equitable, owner of the
mortgaged premises subject to the legal lien of each mort-
gagee. Even in a "title" state the first mortgagee (legal)
different kind of rights in estates. And, therefore, as courts of equity break in
upon the common law, where necessity and conscience require it, still they allow
superior force and strength to a legal title to estates . . . if the law and equity
are administered by the jurisdiction, the rule, qui prior est tempore potior est
jure, must hold."
49 In Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109 [18711 an equitable incumbrancer
of a fund was allowed to take a further advance as against mesne incumbrancers.
50 Note, 18 Eng. Rul. Cas. 526.
51 Note, 18 Eng. Rul. Cas. 526, 527.
52 Campbell, op. cit. supra note 44, at p. 409, note 3.
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acquires only a qualified legal interest which is not as com-
plete as that normally acquired under the English law. In
this class of jurisdictions the subsequent mortgagees (legal)
acquire legal liens, and, as the doctrine of tacking only ap-
plies so as to cut off mesne equities, it would be inapplic-
able. The recording of the mesne incumbrance, if it is re-
cordable, would render the doctrine inapplicable. Some of
the recording statutes in this country authorize the recording
of instruments evidencing equitable interests in land, includ-
ing executory contracts for the sale of land. The result of
compliance with the provisions of such a statute, by the
transferee of a mesne interest, would necessarily be a mod-
ification of the doctrine of tacking; and such transferee
would take priority over a transferee of an interest in the
land after that date. Where, however, the recording statute
does not, either expressly or by implication, authorize the
recording of an instrument evidencing an equitable interest
in land, the doctrine would be inapplicable in the law of
mortgages for the reason advanced above.
The doctrine of tacking is quite distinct from, and de-
pends upon a different principle from, that which governs
in consolidation of incumbrances. The two doctrines have,
in some respects, a similar effect, and consolidation has been
referred to as a form of tacking.58 Tacking is the uniting of
two or more debts charged on the same property. Con-
solidation is the right of one who has acquired two or more
mortgage debts respectively charged on different properties,
under mortgages made by the same mortgagor, to refuse to
be redeemed as to one of these mortgages unless redeemed
as to the other or others.
"If a trustee in violation of his trust mortgages trust prop-
erty to X and then gives a second mortgage--i. e., mortgages
the equity of redemption-to Y, it is clear that the doctrine
of bona fide purchaser for value applies to X because he gets
53 See Selby v. Pomfret, 3 De G. F. & J. 595 (1861).
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legal title; as to whether it applies to Y also there is a con-
flict of authority. Decisions which protect the cestui
against the purchaser are usually supported on the basis
that the cestui's right has ceased to be merely that of a
claimant against the trustee and has become a property
right which can be cut off only by a transfer of the legal
title by the trustee. Decisions which protect the purchaser
against the cestui are usually justified on the ground that
the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice
is a salutary one and should be extended to protection of
other property rights than legal interests." 54
II.
Under the bona fide purchaser doctrine notice " is of im-
portance as affecting priority of right. Also, in determining
whether competing equities are equal or unequal, notice
plays an important part. But, under the doctrine of tack-
ing, it was settled in England that a bona fide purchaser of
an equitable interest, without notice of a prior equitable in-
terest outstanding, might, even on subsequently receiving
notice of this interest, acquire the outstanding legal interest
and thus obtain priority over the transferee of the mesne
interest." The general doctrine as to the effect of notice
on priority of right is stated to be that a transferee of a
legal or equitable interest in land, even for a valuable con-
sideration, but with notice that another person has already
received a transfer of an equitable interest in the same prop-
erty, created by the same transferor, takes his interest sub-
ject to the prior one.5" On the other hand, the transferee of
a legal interest, who paid a valuable consideration therefor
54 Clark, Principles of Equity, § 304.
The question as to what would be the effect. of notice of a mesne equitable
interest in mortgaged land, where a first mortgage (legal) includes future advances
within its security and the mortgagee lends a further sum to the mortgagor after
he has such notice, will be considered infra.
55 The question as to what constitutes "value" will be considered in!ra.
56 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at. § 769.
57 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 591.
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but who had no notice of an outstanding equitable interest
existing in favor of another transferee, created by the same
transferor, takes free from the prior equitable interest. 8
At an early date Lord Hardwicke, in Le Neve v. Le Neve,"
stated the doctrine to be that the transferee of a legal in-
terest, although for a valuable consideration, who has notice
of an outstanding competing equitable interest, is not en-
titled to priority over that interest for the notice makes the
transferee of the legal interest a mala fide purchaser; that
this is a species of fraud. But Lord Hardwicke was con-
sidering a case involving a construction of the statute of 7th
Anne, c. 20, which was designed to protect subsequent pur-
chaser and mortgagees against prior secret conveyances and
fraudulent incumbrances. Both the preamble and the body
of this statute show that it was enacted to prevent fraud.60
But it is too much to conclude from this decision that the
whole bona fide purchaser doctrine is based upon fraud.
Lord Hardwicke was considering the effect of an actual no-
tice, which might be considered as a species of fraud. But
the decisions certainly show that the notice which is suffi-
cient to affect the priority of right as between competing
interests may fall short of constituting fraud.
There may be a sufficient notice under the bona fide pur-
chaser doctrine to affect priority of right without there be-
ing knowledge. For instance, the record of a deed or mort-
gage, when properly made, is constructive notice to all sub-
sequent purchasers and mortgagees; but such subsequent
transferees may not have knowledge of the existence of the
prior competing interest or its contents. The effect is the
same as if the subsequent transferee did have such knowl-
edge. On the other hand, if a prior transfer is not properly
recorded, the record will not constitute constructive notice
to subsequent transferees; yet, the subsequent purchaser or
58 Op. cit. supra note 57.
59 Amb. 436 (1747).
60 Webb on Record of Title, § 215.
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mortgagee may have knowledge of the prior transfer, ob-
tained either from an examination of the record that is made
or from other reliable sources. Such knowledge would be
sufficient to preserve the position of advantage acquired by
the first transferee.
Notice has been classified as actual, implied and construc-
tive;6 but there is no difference between them as to its con-
sequence. The decisions show that there is a want of pre-
61 "The term constructive notice, or some similar term, ought to be applied
exclusively to the notice that is imparted by the record, which is absolute and need
not. in any sense or degree be actually communicated. . . . where notice is im-
puted from facts and circumstances not amounting to knowledge, nor justifying
the inference of actual personal knowledge, but is presumed from information such
as imposes the duty of inquiry, it is often termed constructive notice, and is in
this sense but a degree of actual notice in its broader meaning. The fact of actual
possession may be entirely unknown to an adverse party, and yet by it, under
the general rule, he is constructively charged with actual notice of the possessory
title, as distinguished from notice by a record of that title. The notice in these
last instances is sometimes, and without doing violence to the meaning of words,
called implied notice; but as used in the law-books this term is ordinarily applied
to that notice which is imputed by law to the principal, because his agent has
knowledge, or is affected by matter of fact in any other form or degree sufficient
to charge notice. . . . Actual notice is more frequently spoken of in its general
sense as contra-distinguished from notice by the record, but in a more limited
sense, and as distinguished merely from the implied and constructive notice last
referred to. In this sense it means that the facts upon which notice is predicated
in some manner directly tend to show that information of the adverse right was
personally brought home to the consciousness of the party charged." Webb,
op. cit. supra note 60, at § 221.
"There are two classes of actual notice, which for convenience may be desig-
nated as 1. Express, which includes all knowledge or information coming to the
party to be charged, of a degree above that which depends upon collateral in-
ference, or which imposes upon him the further duty of inquiry; and 2. Implied,
which imputes knowledge to the party because he is shown to be conscious of
having the means of knowledge, though he does not use them. In other words,
where he chooses to remain voluntarily ignorant of the fact, or is grossly negligent
in not following up the inquiry which the known facts suggest. . . . It [implied
notice] differs from express notice for the reason that the latter is supposed to
be absolutely convincing in itself, while the former merely suggests to the mind
of the person to be thereby affected. the existence of the fact to which his at-
tention is directed, and points out the means by which he may obtain positive
and convincing information. It differs on the other hand from constructive
notice, with which it is frequently confounded, and which it greatly resembles,
with respect to the character of the inference upon which it rests; constructive
notice being the creature of positive law, or resting upon strictly legal inference,
while implied notice arises from inference of fact." Wade on the Law of Notice,
§§ 5, 8.
"Legal or implied notice . . . is the same as constructive notice, and cannot
be controverted by proof." Per Selden, J., in Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y.
354, 359 (1857)
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cision in the use of these terms by the courts, especially, in
the use of the latter two. The difficulty has arisen in con-
nection with the proof of notice, where there is no actual
knowledge of a prior competing interest in the property in-
volved in the particular action or suit. There is, also, a
great diversity of opinion among text-writers in determining
what kinds of notice come within each of the three classes.
The diversity of opinion which exists as to the particular
kinds of notice that come within each of the three classes,
into which notice has been divided by some judges and text-
writers, is not of practical importance. The important
problem is to determine what constitutes a sufficient notice,
where there is no positive information that a prior com-
peting interest in the property exists. Where there is posi-
tive information there is actual notice; but where there is
no positive information, there are still certain situations in
which the facts are sufficient to charge a subsequent mort-
gagee or other purchaser with notice. The difficulty exists
in the latter factual situations and it is with these that the
writer is mainly concerned in this discussion. Professor
Pomerory divides notice into two general classes, actual and
constructive;6" and this classification is made by many
judges. The latter class includes all of those cases where
there is no positive information that a prior competing in-
terest in the property exists, yet, the factual situation is
such as to warrant the conclusion that the subsequent trans-
feree of an interest in the property had notice of such prior
interest.
Where notice is actual, knowledge is generally a necessary
resultant. Some authorities proceed upon the theory the
actual notice and actual knowledge mean the same thing,
in cases where it is necessary to determine what the expres-
sion "actual notice," as it is used in the recording statutes,
means. In Lamb v. Pierce " Morton, J., goes so far as
69 Pornerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 593.
63 113 Mass. 72 (1873).
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to say that, although the party taking the second transfer
of property had knowledge of the existence of a prior com-
peting interest, as it was not proved that he had knowledge
that a deed had been given to the first transferee, he was
not chargeable with actual notice of the deed. The Mass-
achusetts statute required actual notice in order to affect
priority of right as between competing interests. Construc-
tive notice of an unrecorded transfer would not be sufficient
to preserve the position of advantage of the 'transferee un-
der such a transfer; the subsequent bona fide purchaser for
value would be entitled to priority. Proof of open and no-
torious occupation and even of improvement, or of other
facts which would, be reasonably sufficient to put a pur-
chaser upon inquiry, are not sufficient to affect the matter
of priority, according to this view.
Other authorities take a more liberal view in defining
"actual notice," where that expression is used in the record-
ing statutes. They advance the theory that the recording
statutes were intended to protect only those who purchase
in good faith, and not to protect those who purchase mala
fide. Yet it is recognized that when the term "actual no-
tice" is used in a statute some effect must be given to it as
meaning more than what would be sufficient as constructive
notice. 4 Notice is held to be actual when the subsequent
transferee of an interest in land has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a prudent man upon inquiry, which,
if prosecuted with reasonable diligence, would lead to actual
notice of the competing interest in the property. Where the
intending subsequent transferee has such information it is
his duty to make inquiry, and he is guilty of bad faith if he
fails to do so; he will be charged with the actual notice that
the law presumes he would have received if he had made
the inquiry. For example, where constructive notice is
sufficient, it is generally held that actual, open and visible
64 See Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498 (1878).
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occupation of land by the transferee of an unrecorded in-
terest therein, whether known to the subsequent transferee
or not, is sufficient notice to such transferee of the interest
of the prior transferee. Under the latter view as to the
meaning of "actual notice," such occupation by the first
transferee would not of itself be sufficient to affect priority
of right as between him and a subsequent bona fide trans-
feree for value. Something more is required; and it seems
to be sufficient that the subsequent transferee knew of the
occupation." It is not necessary that he have actual
knowledge of the precise claim of the prior transferee. Actual
notice is not taken to mean the same thing as actual knowl-
edge.
Actual notice is said to be information concerning the
prior claim or interest; whereas, constructive notice assumes
that no information concernirig the prior claim or interest
exists. 6 The distinction between the two classes of notice
is said to depend upon the manner of obtaining information
and not upon the amount of information.67 In actual notice
there is knowledge of the factual basis of the prior interest. It
is said that actual notice may be established as a conclusion
of fact either by direct or circumstantial evidence;68 Where-
as, constructive notice is said to be that where information
is inferred by operation of legal presumptions.69 The legal
presumption of notice exists where the intending subsequent
transferee of an interest in a certain tract of land either has
information of certain facts which, while they are not suffi-
cient of themselves to constitute actual notice of a prior
competing interest, are sufficient to put a prudent person
upon an inquiry as to the existence of the prior interest
which does exist, or where certain facts do exist concerning
65 See Brinkman v. Jones, op. cit. supra note 64.
66 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 595.
67 Op. cit. supra note 66.
68 Op. cit. supra note 66.
69 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 604.
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the prior interest which, while the intending subsequent
transferee does not know of them, are sufficient as a matter
of law to preserve the position of advantage obtained by
the prior transferee. If, for instance, G is negotiating for
the purchase of Blackacre from R and he sees or learns that
the land is not in R's possession but is possessed by a third
person, this is sufficient to put G upon an inquiry as to the
nature of the occupant's interest in Blackacre. On the
other hand, in those jurisdictions where the possession of a
third person is sufficient notice to an intending purchaser,
without regard to whether he knows of the fact of posses-
sion, the legal presumption of notice arises apart from the
lack of knowledge of the fact of possession. Likewise, the
recording of a recordable instrument evidencing a prior in-
terest in Blackacre is regarded as sufficient to preserve the
position of advantage in favor of a transferee whether a
subsequent transferee knows of the record or not. In the
one class of cases the presumption is prima facie and, hence,
rebuttable; in the other class,-the presumption is absolute.
Where rebuttable, the presumption of notice may be over-
come by evidence showing that the inquiry was made and
it failed to disclose the existence of any competing prior in-
terest. 0o
There is no general rule by which to determine when a due
inquiry as to the existence of prior competing interests has
been made. Professor Pomerory has made the following
classification of the authorities upon the subject of what con-
stitutes a proper inquiry: 7
(1) Where the prior interest is such as would ordinarily
be evidenced by a recordable instrument, then a search of
the proper record would be necessary to constitute a due
inquiry; and if the record did not disclose the existence of
the interest, the inquiry would generally be sufficient. But
70 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 607.
71 Op. cit. supra note 70, note 1.
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where an intending transferee has information concerning
some matter in pais, some interest dehors the record, or con-
cerning some matter which would not necessarily be shown
by the record, then a search of the records alone would not
be due inquiry.
(2) An intending subsequent transferee who has received
information concerning a prior interest in the property in
controversy should seek information from his transferor.
(3) In some instances an examination of the record and
a questioning of the vendor would not constitute a due in-
quiry. It is necessary, in such cases, to seek information
from third persons. Where a third person is in possession
of the land or is said to claim some interest therein, an in-
quiry from such person has been considered as being neces-
sary to constitute a due inquiry.
Professor Pomerory classifies the species of constructive
notice where the presumption of notice may be overcome by
due inquiry as follows: 72
(1) That where an intending transferee has information
concerning certain matters in pais, which, although they do
not directly tend to show the existence of a prior competing
interest in the property in controversy, are sufficient to put
him, as a prudent man, upon an inquiry concerning the same.
(2) That derived from the possession of some third per-
son.
(3) To some extent, that derived from the pendency of
an action affecting the property.
The same author classifies the species of constructive no-
tice where the presumption seems to be absolute as follows: 7
(1) That derived from recordation of a recordable instru-
ment.
(2) That derived from statutory lis pendens.
72 Op. cit. supra note 71.
78 Op. cit. supra note 71.
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(3) That derived from a recital or reference in an in-
strument forming an essential part of the intending trans-
feree's title.
(4) That where notice has been given to the intending
transferee's proper agent.
The aforementioned species of constructive notice will
now be considered in some detail. Where a transferee of
an interest in land has, at the time of the transfer, knowl-
edge of certain matters in pais, which, although they do not
directly show the existence of a prior competing interest, are
sufficient to put him, as a prudent person, upon an inquiry
concerning the existence and nature of the interest, a pre-
sumption arises that such transferee has obtained informa-
tion of what he might have learned by making a due inquiry.
Where a visible object or structure exists upon certain land
which reasonably suggests the existence of a competing in-
terest in the land, the subsequent transferee of an interest in
the land is charged with constructive notice of the existence
of that interest. It has been held, for example, that a
graded railway track across a farm operates as constructive
notice of the rights of the railway company to the purchaser
of the land.74 A mill race and dam have been held to
operate as constructive notice of easements for the use of
water rights encumbering the property.75 A number of
chimney-pots, visible on the roof of a house, being in excess
of the flues belonging to the house, have been held to give
notice to the purchaser of the house that there was an agree-
ment to grant an adjoining property owner an easement for
the purpose of the passage of smoke.76
74 Paul v. The Connersville, etc., R. R. Co., 51 Ind. 527 (1875).
" ..when a person purchases property where a visible state of things exists
which could not legally exist without the property being subject .to some burden,
he is taken to have notice of the extent and nature of that burden." Per Brett,
L. 3., in Allen v. Seckham [1879] L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 790, 795.
75 Raritan Water Power Co. v. Vegte, 21 N. J. Eq. 463 (1869).
76 Hervey v. Smith, 22 Beav. 299 (1856).
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The general system and practice of recording instruments
in this country renders this species of constructive notice of
little practical importance. The matter has been of greater
importance in England due to the system of conveyancing
used there. The most frequent cases involve the absence
or non-production of title deeds. The inability of the trans-
feror to produce the deeds, or knowledge on the part of the
intending transferee that the deeds are in the possession of
a stranger, indicates the existence of an outstanding interest
in the land to which the deeds relate. Professor Pomerory
has classified the cases where this problem is involved as
follows: 17
(1) Where the intending transferee knows that the deeds
are in the possession of a third person; this is generally con-
sidered as operating to give constructive notice of the inter-
est which such third person might have in the property to
which the deeds relate, especially if the intending transferee
intentionally omits to make any inquiry concerning the na-
ture of the third person's possession.
(2) Mere absence or non-production of the title deeds
is not now considered as operating to give constructive no-
tice to the intending purchaser, if he in good faith inquires
for them and is given a reasonable excuse for their non-pro-
duction. Omission to make further inquiry is not the "culp-
able neglect" which the English cases now require, under
such circumstances, to constitute constructive notice.
(3) Omission to make any inquiries concerning the title
deeds relating to the property operates as constructive no-
tice to the intending transferee; this is considered by the
English cases to be "culpable negligence." 78
77 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 612.
78 It is clear that there is no negligence in the cases dealing with the problem
of constructive notice as that term is ordinarily understood. There is no duty
on the part of a subsequent transferee to make any inquiry concerning the where-
abouts of the title deeds such as would give rise to an action for damages for a
failure to perform, it. If it is a duty, it is not a duty owing to the transferee of
a prior competing interest. It is merely the course which an intending subsequent
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Where an intending transferee finds the apparent owner
of property, with whom he is dealing, in possession of all
of the deeds, he is in a position analagous to that of an in-
tending transferee in this country who examines the record
and finds the intending transferor's title free from competing
interest. 9 In each instance, the intending transferee stands
in a like position of advantage and protection.
An intending transferee of land is conclusively presumed
to have notice of every matter connected with or affecting
the property that appears, either by description of parties,
by recital, by reference, or otherwise, on the face of any
recordable deed which is recorded and which forms an es-
sential link in the chain of instruments through which he
must derive his title. 0 *This rule applies to recorded in-
struments evidencing equitable interests in the property as
well as to recorded instruments evidencing legal interests.8 '
Where the instrument evidencing the prior interest is not
recorded but is referred to in the instrument evidencing a
competing interest that is subsequently transferred to an-
other person, the latter is chargeable with notice of the
prior interest and takes subject thereto;12 and this would be
so whether the prior instrument is recordable or not. For
instance, if E takes a mortgage on Blackacre from R who
claims Blackacre under a will, by which the land is encum-
bered with legacies in favor of C and D, E cannot deduce
his title without the will, and therefore will be chargeable
with notice of the interests of C and D. 8 The reason for
these rules is that they give security in land ownership. 84
transferee, dealing bona fide and in the manner that a prudent person would
deal for his own benefit, would follow with a view to his own security. Per
Fry, L. J., in Northern Counties of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Whipp, op. cit.
supra note 16.
79 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 612, note 1.
80 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 626.
81 Cf. Digman v. McCollum, 47 Mo. 372 (1871).
82 Morrison v. Morrison and Berry, 38 Iowa 73 (1874).
83 Thompson v. Blair, 7 N. C. 583, 591 (1819), per Taylor, C. J.
84 Op. cit. supra note 80.
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This phase of the doctrine of constructive notice does not
apply to collateral and immaterial instruments incidentally
referred to, not relating to the title transferred, but only
to the consideration.85 Thus, if a mesne purchaser of Black-
acre, as a part of the consideration for the purchase, con-
veys Whiteacre to his grantor, and the latter conveyance re-
cites or refers to an instrument affecting the title to Black-
acre, a subsequent purchaser of Blackacre is not chargeable
with constructive notice of the instrument referred to in
the deed of Whiteacre. Neither does the doctrine of con-
structive notice apply where the recital states nothing that
would arrest the attention of a prudent person. "Thus,
where the recital in a deed was in substance that it was made
in pursuance of a contract with A, of whom the grantee was
assignee, and as such entitled to th conveyance, it was held
that the legal inference from the facts was in support of the
title, and there was nothing therein imposing upon a bona
fide mortgagee the duty of examining the contract of as-
signment for the purpose of ascertaining if there were latent
defects in the title, or latent equities in favor of the as-
signor." 86
In England and in most jurisdictions in the United States
the actual possession of real estate operates of itself as no-
tice of the interest or interests in the property held by the
occupant. 1 The doctrine is based upon the theory that
an intending transferee will take the ordinary precaution
85 Kansas City Land Co. v. Hill, 11 S. W. 797, 802 (1889), per Pitts, Spec. J.
86 1 Beach on Modem Equity Jurisprudence, § 357.
87 Webb, op. cit. supra note 60, at § 228, and cases cited in the notes thereto.
"... the effect of the constructive notice, due to possession, is a notice of
everything which a party interested in the premises would get by inquiring of the
party in possession. In other words, the actual possession of the premises puts
any person . . . seeking to acquire title [to the premises] . . . to an inquiry of
such person [the occupant of the premises] as to what his title actually is . . ."
Per Pitney, V. C., in Essex County Nat. Bank v. Harrison, 40 At. 209, 211
(N. J. Eq. 1898).
The same doctrine has been applied in this country under the Torrens Laws.
Follette v. Pacific Light & P. Corp., 208 Pac. 295, 23 A. L. R. 865. See note
to this case in 23 A. L. R. 979 et seq.
See note, "Possession of Land as Notice of Title," 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49-140.
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to learn what the situation of the property actually is; and,
if found to be occupied, he will institute an inquiry to as-
certain by whom and in what right.8 Such possession, in
order to be sufficient to constitute notice, must be an actual,
open, visible, and exclusive possession inconsistent with the
title of the apparent owner by the record. 9 The possession
must be unequivocal, and unambiguous. It is insufficient if
equivocal, temporary, or occasional. It must be of a char-
acter which would put a prudent person upon inquiry; it
must be such as to incite inquiry; it must indicate that some
person other than he who appears by the record to be the
owner has an interest in the property. The sufficiency of
the facts depend upon a variety of circumstances. The ex-
88 Truesdale v. Ford, 37 Ill. 210, 214 (1865), per Walker, C. J.
89 In Truesdale v. Ford, op. cit. supra note 88, it was held that. there was
no error in giving the following instruction to the jury: "The mere piling of wood
or lumber, or rails or offal upon a tract of land or lot, unaccompanied by any
other act denoting ownership, is not such possession as would constitute notice
to a bona fide purchaser of such tract of land or lot, unless such piling of wood
or lumber should constitute, in the estimation of the jury, an open, visible and
exclusive possession of the lot in the person piling such wood or lumber." In
Farmers State Bank of Eyota v. Cunningham, 234 N. W. 320 (Minn. 1931), the
plaintiff levied upon the interest of C in a tract of land and purchased the same
on execution sale. This property adjoined a tract upon which C resided with
his sons, C having purchased it from L and executed a contract for a deed
thereto to his sons before the plaintiff levied upon it. The sons lived with their
father and they did most of the farm work, the father working mostly about the
barn. The court held that the question of whether. the tract levied upon was
in possession of the father under the unrecorded contract for a deed to the
sons, or was in the possession of the sons, was for the jury to determine.
The use for which the land is adapted is of importance in determining whether
there is occupation as distinguished from trespasses. For instance, in North Caro-
lina, the annual making of turpentine on land constitutes possession. Bynum v.
Carter, 4 Ired. Law 310 (1844). But the entry upon or acts upon the land may
be upon so small a part thereof that it would amount to only an inadvertent
encroachment without a claim of right, or be considered as permissive and not
adverse. In the western states where, under the pre-emption laws, entries have
been made upon public lands by persons unable to reduce the whole of the
lands to actual occupation by fencing, i. e., by enclosure, and cultivation, other
acts of user have been considered sufficient, such as occupation of a portion of
the tract and the blazing of trees, so as to mark the boundaries of the claim.
See discussion in Plume v. Seward, 4 Cal. 96, 60 Am. Dec. 599 (1854). In Iowa
the running of a plowed furrow around a tract of prairie land has been con-
sidered as a sufficient possession to operate as notice. Buck v. Holt, 74 Iowa
294, 37 N. W. 377 (1888). Laying down a sidewalk, and putting up of a real
estate agent's signboard, announcing the vacant lot for sale, was held a sufficient
notice in Hatch v. Bigelow, 39 Ill. 546 (1864). •
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tent and character of the property, and the uses to which
it may be put, are matters of considerable importance in
determining whether or not the occupancy of it is sufficient
to put a purchaser upon inquiry." Neither residence nor
cultivation are necessary to constitute an actual possession,
when the property is so situated as not to admit of any use-
ful improvement, and the continued claim of the party is
evidenced by public acts of ownership such as he would ex-
ercise over property which he claimed in his own right."
"There is a difference between that bare possession, with-
out any claim of legal or equitable title to the land, such as
may be eventually asserted under the statutes of limitation,
and possession under color or claim of title. In the case
of a 'naked trespasser, the possession must be defined by
actual occupancy or inclosure, or at least by the existence of
visible and definite boundary marks, since otherwise, unless
it be by a statutory limitation of the amount that bare pos-
session will give title to, there is nothing by which the pos-
session can be constructively extended an inch beyond the
actual occupancy." 92 This rule applies where the claim
is not evidenced by a written instrument. "But where the
possession is by virtue of some unrecorded instrument, or
equitable claim of title, there is not in the nature of the case
any reason why the rule as to its character and sufficiency
should be different, whether it is invoked to charge notice
90o Farmers State Bank of Eyota v. Cunningham, op. cit. suPra note 89, at
p. 231, per Wilson, C. J.
91 Royall v. The Lessee of Lisle and Others, 15 Ga. 545, 548 (1854), per
Lumpkin, J.; The Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, 53 (1837), per Mr.
Justice Baldwin.
"This doctrine [that neither residence or cultivation is necessary to constitute
the possession necessary to operate as notice] is obliged to be true, because it
results from the necessity of the case. Suppose, for instance, in North Carolina,
where the courts hold that the cutting of timber is not such an occupancy as
would amount to an adverse possession, would it not be otherwise, if the pine
land was appropriated, yearly, to the making of turpentine? And so, in the
mountain districts of this State, the gold and copper mines are usually distin-
guished by the number of the lot on which they are found." Per Lumpkin, J.,
in Royall v. The Lessee of Lisle and Others.
92 Webb, op. cit. supra note 60, at § 234.
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or to support the statute of limitations. If the claim is by
virtue of an unregistered conveyance, the possession, in either
case, is usually held to extend to the limits defined in the
written instrument, the same as if it were of record." "
The rule is universal that if the possession be consistent
with the recorded interest, it is no notice of an unrecorded
interest. Where, for instance, a husband and wife are in
possession of certain property, and the records disclose that
they are tenants in common, the wife's possession does not
operate as notice of an interest under an unrecorded quit-
claim deed from her husband of an undivided one-half in-
terest in the property. Her possession is not inconsistent
with a continuance of the co-tenancy of her husband.9" But
there may be a visible or notorious change in the possession
of the wife, sufficient to put an intending transferee of an
interest in the property upon an inquiry as to whether there
has been a transfer of an interest to her.
When the occupation of one person is not exclusive, but
in connection with another, with whom there exists a rela-
tionship sufficient to account for the situation, and the cir-
cumstances do not suggest an inconsistent claim, then such
a possession will not operate as notice of an interest not
evidenced by a recorded instrument. A possession of this
kind is neither open, notorious, nor unequivocal. Where
a widow contributed a part of the purchase money of a
farm, and her brother, who contributed the remainder, took
title thereto in his own name without her knowledge, it was
03 Op. cit. supra note 92.
Compare the early Texas statute providing that "',the peaceable and adverse
possession ... as against the person having the right of action shall be construed
to embrace not more than one hundred and sixty acres, including improvements,
or the number of acres actually enclosed should the same exceed one hundred
and sixty acres; but when such possession is taken and held under some written
memorandum of title, other than a deed, which fixes the boundaries of the
possessor's claim and is duly registered, such peaceable possession shall be con-
strued to be co-extensive with the boundaries specified in such instrument.'"
Craig v. Cartwright, 65 Tex. 413, 423 (1886).
94 Ildvedsen v. First State Bank of Bowbells, 24 N. D. 227, 139 N. W.
105 (1912).
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held that the fact that she lived on the farm with him did
not give notice of her resulting trust to a purchaser from
him.9" The possession of a part of a house by a mother will
not operate as constructive notice to a mortgagee of her
son, who occupies the rest of the house and who has the
record title to the whole, that the mother has a life estate
in the part occupied by her, where there is nothing in the
construction of the house to indicate separate possession
by her."8
The possession of land by a tenant or lessee operates as
notice to subsequent transferees not only of interests con-
nected directly with the lease but also of interest acquired
by collateral agreements. This rule prevails both in Eng-
land and in this country.
While the fact that a tenant is in possession operates as
notice of his own interests, there is a conflict of opinion as
to whether the possession also operates as notice of inter-
ests of persons through whom he claims. The English
courts adopt the view that the tenant's possession does not
operate to put a subsequent transferee upon an inquiry as
to the lessor's title, since a tenant is not obligated to dis-
close to whom he pays rent, and it would be unreasonable
to impute notice of a fact which might not be discoverable
by inquiry.97 Such a view seems to be inconsistent with
the broad principle that the possession of tenant operates
as notice of all of the interests which the tenant has ob-
tained from the landlord-transferor and the rule that notice
of the lease is notice of its contents,98 for, if notice of the
contents of the lease exists, there is a disclosure of the iden-
tity of the lessor and the situation is the same as if the land-
lord is in possession. The objection to this theory would
seem to be that it builds one presumption upon another.
95 Harris v. McIntyre, 118 Ill. 275, 8 N. E. 182 (1886).
96 Rankin v. Coar, 46 N. J. Eq. 566, 22 Atl. 177, 11 L. R. A. 661 (1890).
07 Hunt v. Luck (1901] 1 Ch. Div. 45; Note, 12 Col. L. Rev. 549, 550.
98 Hall v. Smith, 14 Ves. 426 (1807); Note, 12 Col. L. Rev. 549, 550.
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If the first reason be unsupportable, the view that posses-
sion should not operate as notice where inquiry would be un-
availing might be based upon the opinion prevailing in Eng-
land that constructive notice is a conclusive presumption of
law.9  So the English courts, being confronted with the
dilemma of holding that possession of a tenant furnishes
absolute notice of the landlord's interest or no notice at all,
prefer to take the latter position to avoid the hardship which
the former would involve. 10 A more desirable solution of
this problem would seem to be to the view that possession
raises only a prima facie presumption that a subsequent
transferee has notice of the interest of the landlord, which
may be rebutted by proof that the lessee failed to disclose
the identity of the lessor, or claimed the fee.' If so, the
transferee could hardly be required to investigate further.
This solution would be satisfactory in a jurisdiction where,
as in England, a long series of assignment of leases and sub-
leases is not uncommon and where a tenant is qualified to
impart information concerning the title of which possession
is the main indication. 0 2
The English view that possession of a tenant does not
operate to give notice of his landlord's interest has been
adopted in some jurisdictions in this country.'0°  The rule
is enforced in some jurisdictions in this country because of
90 "Constructive notice is the knowledge which the Courts impute to' a
person upon a presumption so strong of the existence of the knowledge that it
cannot be allowed to be rebutted, either from his knowing something which ought
to have put him to further inquiry or from his wilfully -abstaining from inquiry,
to avoid notice." Per Farwell, J., in Hunt v. Luck, op. cit. supra note 97, at p. 52.
100 Note, 12 Col. L. Rev. 549, 550.
101 Wade, op. cit. supra note 61, at § 286.
102 In Edwards v. Thompson, 71 N. C. 177, 181 (1874), Rodman, J., said:
"The plaintiff further contends that the possession of Simon was notice only
of Simon's estate and not of that of Thompson, his landlord. This contention
is supported-or seems to be-by the English case of Hanbury v. Litchfield, 2
Mylne & R., 629, 633 . . . We apprehend that however reasonable that doctrine
may be in England, where a long series of assignments and sub-leases is not un-
common, it has no application to the condition of things existing with us, where
such things are almost unknown."
103 Webb, op. cit. supra note 60, at § 236; Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12,
at § 618.
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considerations based upon our recording acts, which are de-
signed to protect subsequent transferees of interests in land
against latent equities."" A subsequent transferee is, by
the law, referred to the record to ascertain the nature of
the interest of the person in possession of land. If there is
no instrument on record conveying an interest to the pos-
sessor, it has been suggested that such transferee can come
to no other conclusion than that the person in possession
has only such an interest as by the statute of frauds and
perjuries may be conveyed without a writing, viz., an estate
under a lease or an estate at will. "In the greater number
of American cases, however, it is held that a purchaser is
bound to make inquiry from the tenant in possession with
respect to all the rights and interests which he claims to
have, and under which he occupies, and is presumed to
know all the facts which he might have learned by such in-
quiry; he must pursue his inquiry to the final source of the
tenant's right, and is thus affected with a constructive no-
tice of the landlord's title and estate." 105
Where the tenant of a grantor remains in possession of
land, after a transfer by the grantor, as tenant of the
grantee, there is a conflict of authority as to whether or not
the possession of the tenant operates as notice to a sub-
sequent transferee of an interest in the property. One view,
sustained by the weight of authority, is that the tenant's
possession is not of itself notice of his new landlord's inter-
est in the land.'0 6 The minority view is that the mere at-
104 See Beattie v. Butler, 21 Mo. 313 (1855).
105 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 618.
This view appears to be based upon the theory that an inquiry from the
tenant would probably disclose the existence of the landlord and the nature of
his interest in the property. At least, such inquiry from the tenant would prob-
ably disclose the existence of the landlord, and, if so, the subsequent transferee
would have to make inquiry from him in order to satisfy the requirement of
due diligence.
106 King v. Paulk, 85 Ala. 186, 4 So. 825 (1888); Note, 12 Col. L. Rev. 549,
551.
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tornment of the tenant to the grantee, without any appar-
ent change of occupancy of the property, is constructive
notice of the interest of the new landlord. 1
0 7
In some jurisdictions it has been decided that where a
grantor of land remains in open, notorious, and exclusive
possession thereof after a conveyance of the premises by
him, such possession is sufficient to put a subsequent trans-
feree of the same premises upon inquiry as to the equitable
rights of such grantor.' These decisions have proceeded
upon the theory that the fact of such possession is, of it-
self, inconsistent with the legal effect of the grantor's deed
and the immediate right of possession by his grantee-a
fact that should favor the presumption that some interest
in the premises still remains in the grantor.0 9 And this rule
prevails even in a jurisdiction where a statute provides that
"the property and possession of the grantor passes fully by
his conveyance as if seisin had been formally delivered." 11o
In other jurisdictions it has been decided that a continued
possession by a grantor, after he has conveyed the property,
does not operate as notice of any interest claimed by him.
The reason generally assigned proceeds upon the ground
that by his deed the grantor has in the most formal manner
107 Duncan v. Matula, 26 S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); Note, 12 Col.
L. Rev. 549, 551.
"A difficult, application of these principles [concerning the extent to which
a tenant's possession operates as notice] was involved in the recent case of
Penrose v. Cooper (Kan. 1912) 121 Pac. 1103, where a tenant of the grantor
remained in possession as tenant of the grantee of an unrecorded deed, and the
defendant occupied the position of a purchaser without actual knowledge of the
deed. The court repudiated the narrow English view, and held that the posses-
sion of the tenant was presumptive notice of his new landlord's title. It apparent-
ly ignored, however, the fact that the tenancy had commenced prior to the
making of the unrecorded conveyance, and that the defendant had knowledge of
the original lease. . . .a purchaser who knows of a lease from his grantor to
the tenant in possession should be entitled to rely upon his information without
further inquiry, and to refer the tenant's possession to the previous lease, in the
absence of any change of occupancy to arouse his suspicions." Note, 12 Col. L.
Rev. 549, 551.
108 Gewin v. Shields, 187 Ala. 153, 65 So. 769 (1914); Pel v. McElroy, 36
Cal. 286 (1868); McLaughlin v. Shepherd, 32 Me. 143, 52 Am. Dec. 646 (1850).
109 Peli v. McElroy, op. cit. supra note 108.
110 Gewin v. Shields, op. cit. supra note 108.
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divested himself of all title and the right to possession, and
a subsequent transferee is justified in acting upon the pre-
sumption that he continues in possession in subordination
to the title of his vendee."' "One difficulty with this latter
view is that it imputes to a conveyance an effect as a declara-
tion by the grantor, for the purpose of raising an estoppel
against him, which is not necessarily in accord with the
understanding of the parties or with the legal effect of the
conveyance. One executing, for instance, a conveyance of
a fee simple title, may perfectly well acquire, by the same
or a subsequent transaction, an equity against the grantee
or a lease for a limited period, and it is difficult to see why
his conveyance should be regarded as a declaration that he
has not acquired, or will not acquire, such an interest, or
why a subsequent purchaser should be justified in assum-
ing, for the purpose of being relieved from any duty of in-
quiry, that the grantor's continuance in possession is wrong-
ful rather than rightful." 112 In the jurisdictions that adopt
this view, there is a conflict of opinion as to whether or not
a continuance of possession for a considerable period of time
operates as notice of an equity claimed by him. The weight
of authority supports the view that it does operate as no-
tice. 1 ' The minority view proceeds upon the theory that
no distinction should be made in such cases for it would be
inconsistent with the estoppel created in the grantor's deed
and would be contrary to the spirit of the recording laws.'"
111 Morgan v. McCuin, 96 Ark. 512, 132 S. W. 519 (1910); McEwen v.
Keary, 178 Mich. 6, 144 N. W. 524, L. R. A. 1916B, 1063 (1913); Baldwin v.
Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578 (1913).
Another reason that has been given is that the object of the law, in holding
that possession operates as notice, is to protect the possessor against the claims
of those who do not derive their interests from him,--not to protect him against
his own acts, and especially against his own deed. McEwen v. Keary, per Bird, J.
112 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 571 (g).
113 Turman v. Bell, 4 Ark. 273, 15 S. W. 886, 26 Am. St. Rep. 35 (1891);
Bennett v. Robinson, 27 Mich. 26 (1873).
114 Jones v. Grimes, 115 Miss. 874, 76 So. 735 (1917).
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As a general rule, one who is not a party to a suit is not
affected by the judgment of the court deciding the con-
troversy. There is an important exception to this rule, viz.,
"one who acquires from a party to the proceeding an inter-
est in the property, which is at that time involved in a litiga-
tion in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
of the person of the one from whom the interest is acquired,
takes subject to the rights of the parties to the litigation as
finally determined by the judgment or decree, and is as
conclusively bound by the result of the litigation as if he
had been a party thereto from the outset." "I This gen-
eral common law doctrine is known as "lis pendens." This
doctrine is one of ancient origin. It was first definitely
formulated by Lord Bacon in his twelfth "Ordinance in
Chancery" providing that "No decree bindeth any that
cometh in bona fide by conveyance from the defendant, be-
fore the bill is exhibited, and is made no party, neither by
bill nor by order; but when he comes in pendente lite, and
while the suit is in full prosecution, and without any colour
of allowance or privity of the court, there regularly the de-
cree bindeth." 116 Chancellor Kent's opinion in Murray v.
Ballou,"7 decided in 1815, appears to be the foundation of
the doctrine in this country. It generally conceded that
lis pendens, as applied in our time, originated "in the com-
mon law rule obtaining in real actions to the effect that, if
the defendant aliened during the pendency of the action,
the judgment in the real action overreached the aliena-
tion." 118 The doctrine now applies in equity as well as at
law.
The doctrine of lis pendens has been referred to, both in
English and American cases as an equitable one based upon
constructive notice; "but the better view is that it is founded
115 Lis Pendens, 38 C. J., pp. 4, 5.
116 2 Bacon's Works, 479.
117 1 John. Ch. 566 (1815).
118 De Pass v. Chitty, 105 So. 148, 149 (Fla. 1925), per Terrell, J.
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upon the necessity of both equity and common law courts
of keeping the subject of the litigation before the court and
preventing frustration of the court's judgment or decree." 119
The very nature of the doctrine, as it was formulated at the
common law, was such as to show that it was not based up-
on the principles underlying the doctrine of constructive
notice. "In fact, it applied in cases in which there was a
physical impossibility that the purchaser could know, with
any possible diligence on his part, of the existence of the
suit, unless all contracts were made in the office from which
the writ issued, and on the last moment of the day. For,
at common law, the writ was pending from the first moment
of the day on which it was issued and bore teste; and a pur-
chaser, on or after that day, held the property subject to
the execution upon the judgment in that suit as the defend-
ant would have held it, if no alienation had been made." 12 o
Because of the severity and harshness of the doctrine of
lis pendens, statutes have been enacted in many states re-
quiring recordation of a formal notice of the pendency of
the suit or action before a bona fide purchaser for value is
chargeable with notice. These statutes do not, as a general
rule, embody all of the law of lis pendens in the particular
jurisdictions in which they are operative, but are rather re-
garded as imposing restrictions upon the common law rule
otherwise existing upon the subject. Actions or proceed-
ings of a class not embraced within the terms of the partic-
ular statute remain subject to the common law rule. 2' Even
119 Clark, op. cit. supra note 33, at § 460.
120 Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. 93, 102 (1823), per Green, J.
"The Court of Chancery adopted the rule, in analogy to the common law,
but relaxed, in some degree, the severity of the common law. For no Us pendens
existed until the service of the subpoena and bill filed; but it existed from the
service of the subpoena, although the bill was not filed until long after; so that
a purchaser, after service of the subpoena and before the bill was filed, would,
after the filing of the bill, be deemed to be a lite pendente purchaser." Per
Green, J., in Newman v. Chapman.
121 Rardin v. Rardin, 102 S. E. 295, 297 (W. Va. 1919), per Lynch, 3. In
some jurisdictions the statutes are construed as abolishing the common law rule,
leaving the statutory law as the only rule upon the subject. Macdermot v. Hayes,
170 Pac. 616 (Cal. 1917).
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apart from statutory regulation, the harshness of the doc-
trine, in its effects upon bona fide purchasers, was recognized,
and its operation was confined to the extent of the policy
upon which it was founded--i. e., to the giving of full effect
to the judgment or decree which might be rendered in the
action or suit pending at the time of the purchase. 2 '
The ground of judicial necessity, on which the doctrine
of lis pendens is based, yields to the social interest in favor
of free operations of commerce. Hence, the rule does not
apply to negotiable paper purchased before maturity.'23 As
to whether the rule applies to chattels generally, there is a
conflict of authority.'24 In Murray v. Lilbury,"2 ' a case
that is frequently cited, Chancellor Kent holds the doctrine
to be applicable to bonds 126 and mortgages, because he says
that they are not usually the subject of ordinary commerce;
but he says that he is not prepared to hold that it would
affect cash, negotiable paper not due, and movable property,
122 "As proof of this, if the suit was not prosecuted with effect, as if a suit
at law was discontinued, or the plaintiff suffered a non-suit, or if a suit in
Chancery was dismissed for want of prosecution, or for any other cause not
upon the merits, or if at law or in Chancery a suit abated, although, in all these
cases, the plaintiff, or his proper representative, might bring a new suit for the
same cause, he must rpake the one who purchased pending the former suit, a
party; and, in this new suit, such purchaser would not be affected at all by the
pendency of the former suit at the time of his purchase. In the case of an
abatement, however, the original suit might be continued in Chancery, by re-
vivor, or at law, in real actions, abated by the death of a party, by journies
accounts, and the purchaser still be bound by the final judgment or decree." Per
Green, J., in Newman v. Chapman, op. cit. supra note 120, at p. 103.
"Purchasers of property involved in a pending suit may be admitted as parties,
in the discretion of the court; but they cannot demand, as of absolute right, to
be made parties . . Y Per Mr. Justice Harlan, in Mellen v. Moline Malleable
Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352, 371, 33 Law Ed. 178, 184 (1888).
"Where there is a purchase pendente lite, not only is the purchaser bound
by the decree that may be made against the person from whom he derives title,
but 'the litigating parties are exempted from taking any notice of the title so
acquired; and such purchaser need not be made a party to the suit? . . .
He is not a necessary party, because his vendor or grantor remains as the repre-
sentative of his interests . . ." Per Magruder, J., in Norris v. Ile, 38 N. E. 762,
766, 43 Am. St. Rep. 233, 240 (Ill. 1894).
123 Winston v. Westerfeldt, 22 Ala. 760 (1853); Note, 22 Har. L. Rev. 455;
Clark, op. cit. supra note 33, at § 460.
124 OP. cit. supra note 119.
125 2 John. Ch. 441 (1817).
128 Apparently the bonds were non-negotiable.
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such as horses, cattle and grain. In a few cases the courts
have made a distinction between personal property that is
not ordinarily "kept for sale" and "an article of ordinary
commerce," concluding that lis pendens should apply to the
former 127 for the same reason that it applies to real prop-
erty. In Wigram v. Buckley 12 the English rule was stated
to be that lis pendens does not apply to personal property
other than chattel interests in land. But this case involved
a suit respecting "book debts"--non-negotiable securities.129
The better view, -and probably the numerical weight of
authority supports this view, -is that all personal property,
except negotiable instruments, should come within the scope
of operation of lis pendens. The probability of the defend-
ant's entirely defeating the object of the suit or action by a
transfer of the property pendente lite is rather greater in the
case of personal property than of real estate. So that, for the
protection of litigants, it would seem that a more rigid rule
should be adopted to prevent the disposal of personalty
than of realty pendente lite. The arguments urged in sup-
port of the contrary view are drawn from the necessity of
adopting no rule that would impair the freedom of com-
mercial transactions, and of protecting bona fide purchasers
of that of which possession is the chief indicium of owner-
ship. 180
The rule is frequently stated to be that lis pendens applies
to any transfer of the subject matter of the litigation, or
any encumbrance or charge created against it, or any con-
tract entered into affecting it, by either party to the con-
127 See North Carolina Land & L. Co. v. Boyer, 191 Fed. 552, 39 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 627 (1911); Chase v. Searles, 45 N. H. 511 (1864). In Carr v. Lewis
Coal Co., 15 Mo. App. 551 (1884), lis pendens was held to apply to a river tug.
128 [18941 L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 483.
129 In Pennsylvania the doctrine of Us pendens is applied to non-negotiable
securities. Diamond v. Lawrence County, 37 Pa. St. 353, 78 Am. Dec. 429 (1860).
130 Note, 14 Am. Dec. 774, 779.
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troversy , but the doctrine is ordinarily applied to transfers
or encumbrances made by defendants, and is ordinarily in-
voked by plaintiffs.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether the courts
of a sister state are bound, by the "full faith and credit"
clause of the Federal Constitution, to give the doctrine of
lis pendens extra-territorial effect. In two jurisdictions the
view is adopted that lis pendens does not operate beyond
the state in which the action is pending, and that the judg-
ment therein is not enforceable as against one who pur-
chases the property involved in the litigation, after its re-
moval from the state, in good faith and without actual no-
tice of the pendency of the action.1"' This view is sup-
ported on the basis that the '"full faith and credit" clause
of the Federal Constitution "goes only to the operation such
records [referred to therein] shall have when complete and
subsequently offered in evidence, as establishing that cer-
tain facts have been adjudicated, and has no reference as
to what shall be the incidental effect of a suit which results
in such records being made." 132 In one jurisdiction the
view exists that the removal of the property from the state,
followed by its sale, does not relieve from the operation of
the pre-existing suit or action. 3 ' This view is supported
on the basis that when a "judicial proceeding" exists, it
operates, not only upon parties and privies, but also upon
pendente lite purchasers. The latter view seems to con-
form more nearly to the spirit and letter of the "full faith
and credit" clause; and it is the more desirable rule.
Some courts assert the rule to be that a grantee in a
quitclaim deed is not entitled to the rights of a bona fide
purchaser because the nature of this conveyance is such
131 Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 8 S. W. 907, 9 Am. St. Rep. 328
(1888); Shelton v. Johnson, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 672, 70 Am. Dec. 265 (1857) and
note.
182 Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., op. cit. supra note 13i.
133 Fletcher and Sharp v. Ferrel, 9"Dana (Ky.) 372, 35 Am. Dec. 143 (1840).
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as to put him upon an inquiry, and indicates that there may
be outstanding, unrecorded competing interests; so that if
there are prior competing interests in the land conveyed by
the quitclaim deed the grantee therein takes subject to these
interests." The position of the quitclaim grantee, under
this view, is analagous to that of a purchaser of negotiable
paper after maturity; in either case, there is the assump-
tion of the risk that there may be outstanding claims. In
some of the cases, where this rule is applied, the facts in-
dicated that the quitclaim grantee suspected outstanding
claims existed and took a chance upon securing priority over
them; 185 the fact that the property was offered to him, in
some instances, at a very low figure should have been suffi-
cient to arouse his suspicions."3 6  Probably in these juris-
dictions a quitclaim deed was not the usual form of con-
veyance. But even if this form of conveyance is not in
common use in the jurisdiction and if the form of the in-
strument is regarded as sufficient to put the grantee upon
inquiry as to the existence of outstanding competing
equities, it is doubtful as to whether the courts in any juris-
diction would go so far as to hold that the quitclaim grantee
is charged with notice of all competing equities that might
possibly exist in the land conveyed to him. An equity or
interest may not only be unknown to such grantee, but un-
discoverable by the exercise of reasonable care; and, if an
equity of this kind exists, the quitclaim grantee should' be
considered as a bona fide purchaser with regard to it, not-
withstanding the recording acts. If the quitclaim grantee
has made a diligent search of the records and the prior in-
terest is not recorded, and the grantee has no actual notice
of it and cannot discover it by the exercise of reasonable
134 Runyon v. Smith, 18 Fed. 579 (Cir. Ct., E. D. Mich. 1883); Lowry v.
Brown, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 456 (1860).
135 See Runyon v: Smith, op. cit. supra note 134; Derrick v. Brown, 66
Ala. 162 (1880).
136 See Derrick v. Brown, op. cit. supra note 135.
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diligence, he should have priority over it under the record-
ing statutes in any jurisdiction."3 7 Recognizing that such
interests might exist, the Supreme Court of the United States
and the courts in a few jurisdictions are definitely committed
to the rule that a quitclaim deed is not of itself sufficient to
deprive the grantee therein of the position of a bona fide
purchaser. It is, however, a circumstance, in a jurisdic-
tion where this form of conveyance is not in common use,
along with other circumstances, to be considered in deter-
mining whether or not the grantee takes bona fide.3 In
some jurisdictions the courts recognize the doctrine that a
quitclaim deed passes only the interest which the grantor
has in the land; it is sufficient to pass that title but not
to enable the grantee to take priority over outstanding
equities."'s
There is a conflict of authority as to whether or not a
statute declaring that a quitclaim deed shall be sufficient
to pass all the interest which the grantor could lawfully con-
vey by deed of bargain and sale affects the question as to
whether a quitclaim grantee is chargeable with notice of
prior competing equities. In some jurisdictions such a stat-
ute has been declared to have no bearing upon the question
137 See Merrill v. Hutchinson, 25 Pac. 215 (Kan. 1890); Johnson v. Wil-
liams, 14 Pac. 537 (Kan. 1887); Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 21 (1892).
138 See Moelle v. Sherwood, op. cit. supra note 137; Chapman v. Sims,
53 Miss. 154 (1876); Johnson v. Williams, op. cit. supra note 137.
139 Smith's Heirs v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 21 Ala. 125 (1852); Snow v.
Lake's Administrator, 20 Fla. 656, 51 Am. Rep. 625 (1884); Baker v. Woodward,
12 Ore. 3, 6 Pac. 173 (18.84).
"This court has long recognized the doctrine that the immediate grantee under
a purely quitclaim deed of release, obtains just such title as his vendor had, and
subject to the same defenses, and is not a bona fide purchaser without notice
within the meaning of the recording acts." Per Brown, J., in Rabinowitz v.
Houk, 129 So. 501, 510 (Fla. 1930).
"Since the grantor's legal title passes by either form of conveyance [quitclaim
or warranty deed] .. .and since the legal title in a purchaser for value is subject
only to the equities of which he had notice at the time of the purchase .. . it
seems that a quitclaim deed should cut off equities as effectually as a warranty
deed in the absence of actual or constructive notice. The rule must therefore rest
on the reason commonly assigned, that a quitclaim deed is constructive notice of
defects in the grantor's title." Note, 10 Col. L. Rev. 371.
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under consideration. 4 ° The purpose of the legislature in
passing the statute is said to be to remove any doubt about
the passing of the grantor's title under this form of con-
veyance, rather than to affect the matter of notice. Other
courts, in dealing with this type of statute, take the view
that a quitclaim deed is thereby elevated into a deed of
bargain and sale, so that the quitclaim grantee obtains
more than a mere release of any interest that his grantor
may have in the property; he is entitled to rank as a bona
fide purchaser, and, if he gives value and has no notice,
for instance, of a prior unrecorded warranty deed, he takes
priority over the interest evidenced by the prior deed.'""
The former view has been influenced by the fact that the
recording statute of the jurisdiction left the question of
"good faith" open;' 4 ' the latter view has not been so af-
fected. It seems to be assuming too much to say that the
legislature had the recording statute in mind when it passed
the statute enlarging the scope of operation of a quitclaim
deed; if so, it probably would have declared its intention up-
on the matter of notice. This is precisely what was done
in Minnesota, where the recording statute was amended so
as to provide that a quitclaim deed should not affect the
question of "good faith" of the grantee therein. 4
In Missouri, by virtue of the operation of the recording
statute, a bona fide purchaser under a quitclaim deed is
protected against prior competing interests evidenced by
unrecorded recordable instruments.' The recording act
140 Runyon v. Smith, op. cit. supra note 134; Baker v. Woodward, op. cit.
supra note 137.
141 Cutler v. James, 64 Wis. 173, 54 Am. Rep. 603 (1885).
1-2 See Runyon v. Smith, op. cit. supra note 134.
143 Gen. Stats. of Minn. (1913) § 6844.
144 Ridgeway v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 444 (1875); Hope v. Blair, 16 S. W.
595 (Mo. 1891); Munson v. Ensor, 7 S. W. 108 (Mo. 1888); Fox v. Hall, 74
Mo. 315 (1881). In the latter case the court said: "... in Ridgeway v. Holliday
a quitclaim deed from one whose title had been transferred by adverse
possession, was held to pass no right as against the adverse occupant to whom
such title had been so transferred, for the reason that such title by possession was
not subject to the recording acts and could not be recorded, and the grantee in
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is construed as abolishing the equitable doctrine of notice
in regard to all instruments coming within the scope of its
operation. But if the prior interest is one evidenced by an
instrument that is not required to be recorded, or by an in-
strument that is not required to be recorded but is never-
theless recorded, the equity arising under such instrument
is not "cut off" by a subsequent quitclaim deed evidencing
a competing instrument. The same is true where the prior
interest is one that is not evidenced by any writing. But, to
conform to the true spirit of the recording act, it would
seem that the prior equity should be reduced to a recordable
interest and recorded in order to preserve its position of
advantage. The rule in this jurisdiction is undoubtedly
affected by the fact that a quitclaim deed which is intended
to and purports to convey an absolute right to the land, as
contradistinguished from a conveyance of the title or chance
of title which the grantor may be supposed to have, was in
common use when the rule was formulated.145 Quite nat-
urally, where this form of a quitclaim deed is in common
use, there would be nothing in the form of the deed itself
to affect the bona fide nature of the transaction. If the
quitclaim grantee takes without actual notice of an out-
standing competing equity in the land, and without notice
of any facts, which, if followed up, would ordinarily lead
to knowledge of such competing equity, and if he pays an
adequate price for the land, he should be considered as a
the quitclaim deed took only what the grantor could lawfully convey. It has
been repeatedly decided by this court that a grantee in a sheriff's deed, made in
pursuance of a sale under execution, is a purchaser within the meaning of the
recording act, and it is equally well settled that by virtue of such conveyance
he takes only such interest as the judgment debtor had. [Citing cases.] . . . In
other words, a grantee in a sheriff's deed acquires precisely the same rights which
he would have acquired by a quitclaim deed from the judgment debtor, except
in cases where the judgment debtor has made fraudulent conveyances before
judgment, in which cases the purchaser at execution sale acquires the additional
right to set such conveyance aside."
145 In Munson v. Ensor, op. cit. supra note 144, the court said: "Here the
deed is 'remise, release, and forever quitclaim the following described lot,' etc.,--
a form of conveyance in common use."
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bona fide purchaser. But if he did not pay an adequate
price, or if he had actual notice of the competing equity, or
notice of such facts, which, if followed up, would lead to
knowledge of the prior equity, the bona fide nature of the
transaction would be affected; and this would be equally
true if, instead of acquiring his interest under a quitclaim
deed, he acquires it under a warranty deed. 4 6  But, under
the Missouri view, these principles would only be operative
where the prior competing interest is evidenced by an un-
recorded recordable instrument.
In Texas it is well settled that where it clearly appears,
from the terms of the deed, or, in case of doubt, from the
terms of the deed, adequacy of price given, and other cir-
cumstances, that the grantor intended to quitclaim to the
vendee only such claim or interest in the land as he might
own therein, the deed will not support a claim of purchase
in good faith. This type of conveyance may be designated
as a quitclaim deed in the strict sense. On the other hand,
if the deed, although the grantor uses the word "quitclaim"
therein, purports to convey the land, as contradistinguished
from a conveyance of the title or chance of title which the
grantor may be supposed to have, it is not such an instru-
146 Compare the discussion in Moelle v. Sherwood, op. cit. supra note 137,
at pp. 28, 29, 30 (1892): "There may be many reasons why the holder of prop-
erty may refuse to accompany his conveyance of it with an express warranty of
the soundness of its title or its freedom from the claims of others . . . He may
hold the property only as a trustee or in a corporate or official character, and be
unwilling for that reason to assume any personal responsibility as to its title or
freedom from liens, or he may be unwilling to do so from notions peculiar to
himself . . . In many parts of the country a quitclaim or a simple conveyance
of the grantor's interest is the common form in which the transfer of real estate
is made. A deed in that form is, in many cases, as effectual to divest and transfer
a complete title as any other form of conveyance .... In the . . . case of bargain
and sale, he [the grantor] impliedly asserts the possession of a claim to or
interest in the property, for it is the property itself which he sells and undertakes
to convey. In the . . . case of quitclaim, the grantor affirms nothing as to the
ownership, and undertakes only a release of any claim to or interest in the
premises which he may possess without asserting the ownership of either ...
Covenants of warranty do not constitute any operative part of the instrument
in transferring the title. That passes independently of them. They are separate
contracts, irtended only as guaranties against future contingencies."
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ment as will charge the grantee with notice of prior equities
or prior interests evidenced by unrecorded instruments.'4 7
One who takes under a quitclaim deed in the strict sense is
not protected as a bona fide purchaser, under the Texas
recording statute.'48 In Arizona, where the recording stat-
ute is "taken from Texas," the Supreme Court refused to
apply the Texas doctrine, holding that a deed which pur-
ported to convey only the "right, title, and interest" of the
grantor does not thereby charge the grantee with notice of
prior interests evidenced by unrecorded recordable instru-
ments, within the spirit and purpose of the recording stat-
ute. 4 ' This, it is submitted, is the more desirable rule; and
it should apply where the prior interest is one that is not
evidenced by a recordable instrument, for the equity should
be reduced to a recordable interest and recorded.
In jurisdictions where a quitclaim deed will not support
a claim of bona fide purchase there is a conflict of authority
as to whether a purchaser from the quitclaim grantee who
takes under a warranty deed is, because there is a quit-
claim deed in his chain of title, charged with notice of
equities existing against the quitclaim grantor's title. In
Texas the fact that there is a quitclaim deed of the strict
type in the chain of title is sufficient to charge the grantee
in the warranty deed with such notice.' In other juris-
dictions where the courts adopt either the view that a quit-
claim grantee is chargeable. with notice, because of the form
147 Hagaman v. Shaklee, 243 S. W. 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Duckworth
v. Collie, 235 S. W. 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).; Threadgill v. Bickerstafl, 29
S. W. 757 (Tex. 1895). See Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 26 Am. Rep. 304
(1877).
148 See Thorn v. Newsom, 64 Tex. 161, 53 Am. Rep. 747 (1885); Taylor
v. Harrison, op. cit. supra note 147.
140 Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Old Dominion Co., 253 Pac. 435, 59 A.
L. R. 625 (1927). See note to this case in 59 A. L. R. 632 et seq.
150 Houston Oil Co. Niles, 255 S. W. 604 (Comm'n of Civ. App. of Tex.
1923). See Cook v. Smith, 174 S: W. 1094 (Tex. 1915). In the first of these
cases the court said: ". . . the holder of a title in which there appears, however
remote, a quitclaim deed is prevented from asserting the defense of innocent pur-
chaser as against an outstanding title or secret trust or equity existing at the
time the quitclaim deed was executed."
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of the conveyance, of prior competing equities, or the view
that a quitclaim deed is simply a release of such interest as
his grantor has in the land conveyed, a subsequent pur-
chaser who takes from the quitclaim grantee under a war-
ranty deed is not chargeable with notice of equities exist-
ing against the quitclaim grantor's title merely because such
purchaser's grantor had previously purchased under a quit-
claim deed and is not, because of that fact, prevented from
acquiring priority over such equities.15' If the immediate
purchaser under a warranty deed from a quitclaim grantee
may be entitled to rank as a bona fide purchaser, a fortiori
a remote purchaser's position as a bona fide purchaser
should not be affected by the fact that a quitclaim deed
occurs in his chain of title.'52 Whether the purchaser under a
warranty deed be an immediate purchaser from a quitclaim
grantee or a remote purchaser, the fact that he pays what
the parties deem to be the full value of the premises shows
that he is bargaining for a valid title. The fact that the
equity existing against the quitclaim grantor's title has not
been recorded for a considerable period of time before the
quitclaim grantee sells the land is a factor of importance
under the recording acts. The policy of the recording
acts requires that titles to real estate should become matter
of public record. If the competing equity is not recordable,
it should be reduced to a recordable interest and recorded
to preserve its position of advantage. "It is not unreason-
able to assume that a quitclaim deed occurs in the line of
many titles, where there is no outstanding equity." I's It
has been said that to extend the rule that a quitclaim
grantee is bound to ascertain at his peril what outstanding
151 McCollum v. Burton, 127 So. 224 (Ala. 1930); Bell v. South Arkansas
Land Co., 196 S. W. 117 (Ark. 1917); Winkler v. Miller, 54 Iowa 476 (1880);
Downs v. Rich. 81 Kan. 43, 105 Pac: 9, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1035 (1909), and
note to this case in 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1035.
152 Rabinowitz v. Houk, op. cit. supra note 139 (remote purchaser by war-
ranty deed where there was a quitclaim deed in the chain of title).
153 Winkler v. Miller, op. cit. supra note 1$1, at p. 478
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equities, if any, exist to a purchaser under a warranty deed
from such grantee would "tend directly to impair the sell-
ing value of all such property." 154
Where a subsequent transferee of an interest in land, act-
ing himself in the matter, is, according to the principles
already discussed, chargeable with actual or constructive
notice of a prior unrecorded competing interest in the land,
he would be chargeable with notice to the same extent, as
a general rule, where, instead of acting himself, he nego-
tiates the purchase through an agent.'55 This rule is based
154 Op. cit. supra note 153.
In Rabinowitz v. Keefer, 132 So. 297, 299 (1931), the Supreme Court of
Florida said: "In Snow v. Lake . .. this court adopted the rule . . . that a
grantee in a quitclaim deed could not be a bona fide purchaser without notice
within the meaning of the recording acts. This construction of the statute has
been consistently followed by this court since that time, but .. . it has not been
extended in its operation beyond the immediate grantee in a quitclaim, nor do
. ..logic or reason require its extension. To further extend the rule would in
effect amount to the adoption of a new rule, which new rule would . . . work
great injustice and hardship, as is illustrated by the facts in Rabinowitz v.
Houk, as well as in the present case. It may be that, under the doctrine of
stare decisis, it is better in many instances to stick to an old rule, especially in
cases where the old rule has become a rule of property, than to adopt a new
rule, even though the new be better founded in reason than the old. . . . When
it comes to the adoption of a new rule of statutory construction, or when an
effort is made to extend an old rule beyond the limits hitherto recognized, the
courts may well consider the logic, reason, justice, and wisdom, as well as the
soundness of the public policy involved, in the step they are about to take."
155 Webb, op. 'cit. supra note 60, at § 238; Pomerory, op. cit. supra note
12, at § 666.
"The rationale of the rule has been differently stated by different judges; by
some it has been rested upon the presumption of an actual communication be-
tween the agent and his principal; by others, upon the legal conception that for
many purposes the agent and principal are regarded as one." Pomerory, op. cit.
supra note 12, at § 666.
"This general rule is of wide application. It embraces in its operation not only
ordinary agents and attorneys, but all persons who act for or represent others
in business relations and transactions. Thus it applies to directors, managers,
presidents, cashiers, and other officers, while engaged in the business affairs of
their corporations; to trustees acting on behalf of their beneficiaries; to an agent
acting on behalf of a married woman; to one of two or more joint agents; and
to all actual agents, whether the agency be express or implied." Pomerory, op. dt.
supra note 12, at "§ 667.
See note dealing with "Imputation of Attorney's Knowledge of Facts to His
Client," 4 A. L. R. 1592-1623.
"Notice to the agent of a fact which he does not communicate to his principal,
when regarded in law as notice to the latter, is not as to him actual, but con-
structive notice. . . . 'Notice to my agent or counsel is constructive notice to
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upon expediency; it prevents a transferee from avoiding
the results of notice by availing himself of the services of an
agent who might be conveniently blind to whatever seemed
likely to develop a competing interest in the property.'56
As it is the rule that whether the principal is bound by
contracts entered into by his agent depends upon the nature
and extent of the agency, so does the effect upon the princi-
pal of notice to the agent depend upon the same conditions.
That is to say, the knowledge or notice must come to the
agent who has authority to deal in reference to those mat-
ters which the knowledge or notice affects. 5 '
In order to charge the principal with notice, the notice or
knowledge must, as a general rule, come to the agent while
engaged in the same transaction which is sought to be af-
fected by notice; that is, in the same transaction out of
which the principal's rights and liabilities arise, which, it is
contended, are affected by notice. The reason, again, is
one of expediency. A principal should not be subjected to
the risk of the agent remembering information received
prior to the particular transaction and in connection with
matters that were not of any concern to the principal. But
if the information was received by the agent so recently
and is of such a character as that it is not reasonable to
suppose it is absent from the agent's mind while engaged
in the later transaction on behalf of the principal, the rule
is that the principal is chargeable with the notice coming
to the agent. 5'
me,' . . ." Per Burks, J., in Easley and al. v. Barksdale and als., 75 Va. 274, 283
(1881). It follows from this that where the statute requires "actual notice" of
an equity to preserve its position of advantage, information communicated to the
agent will not affect his principal's right as a bona fide purchaser unless the agent
communicates his information to the principal, if it is sought to charge the prin-
cipal with notice, through his agent, of the prior competing equity.
156 Webb, op. cit. supra note 60, at § 238.
157 Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 24 Am. St. Rep. 225 (1891).
158 Webb, op. cit. supra note 60, at § 241.
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The principal is not chargeable with notice where the
agent, for his own convenience, withholds information that
would otherwise affect his principal's rights. The same rule
applies where the agent acting for both parties to the trans-
action conceals information from one at the instance of the
other. 59
W. D. Rollison.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
(To be continued.)
159 Pomerory, op. cit. supra note 12, at §§ 674, 675.
